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II. ARGUMENT IN REPLY
A.

The Motion to Dismiss Should Have Been Granted

Mr. Vaughn has set out in his Opening Brief his argument that the District Court had no
jurisdiction to issue a no contact order in a case it had already dismissed and therefore he could
not be convicted of a felony for violating the invalid order and further that the District Court had
no power to convict Mr. Vaughn for violations of the "amended" order issued in the live case for
contacts occurring prior to service of the "amended" order. Opening Brief at pages 2-5. The
State responds to this argument by asserting that 1) the District Court originally had jurisdiction
in the dismissed and live cases because proper charging documents were filed to initiate the
cases; 2) the error in the no contact order was a clerical error - so that the order was really entered
in the live case, not the dismissed case; and 3) even if the order was actually issued in the
dismissed case, that did not matter because an order was issued nunc pro tunc in the live case,
Mr. Vaughn signed the order, and the time has passed to appeal the order. Respondent's Brief at
pages 5-10. The State's argument should be rejected by this Court.
The State devotes a bit over a page of its brief to arguing that subject matter jurisdiction
is conferred by the filing of a legally sufficient charging document. Respondent's Brief at pages
6-7. And, that is accurate. State v. Lute, 150 Idaho 837, 840,252 P.3d 1255, 1258 (2011). But,
that is beside the point.
The question at issue in this case is not whether the District Court ever had jurisdiction in
the dismissed or live cases. It is whether the District Court had jurisdiction after it dismissed
Case No. CR-FE-2009-0021560 to enter a no contact order in the dismissed case. Mr. Vaughn
maintains that once the case is dismissed, the District Court may no longer issue no contact
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orders in the case. ICR 46.2(a). See also, State v. Jakoski, 139 Idaho 352, 79 P3.d 711 (2003).
Despite its arguments about whether the District Court ever had any jurisdiction in the dismissed
case, which is not disputed, the State offers no argument to support the non sequitur conclusion
that once jurisdiction vests, the District Court can continue forever to enter orders in a case
regardless of the fact that the case has since been dismissed. This Court should reject the State's
proposition as contrary to law, logic and the public interest.
The second point of the State's argument appears to be that the no contact order was
actually entered in the live case and that the inclusion of the case number of the dismissed case
was simply a clerical error. Respondent's Brief at pages 7-9. The State cites no authority for its
argument that the error is a clerical error. On that basis alone, the State's argument should be
rejected. See State v. Zichko, 129 Idaho 259, 263, 923 P.2d 966,970 (1996). But, the argument
should also be rejected because the error was not a clerical error - that is an error of recitation of
the sort that a clerk might commit. ICR 36; United States v. Robinson, 368 F.3d 653, 767 (6th
Cir.2004).
A clerical error is an error in transposing numbers or letters or mis-typing a letter or
number. See/or example, Carter v. Norris, 240 S.W.3d 124, 126-7 (Ark. 2006) (typing "1987"
instead of" 1986" in judgment when information and direct appeal and numerous petitions all
contained 1986 was a mere clerical error in the judgment); Michael v. Michael, 454 So.2d 1035,
1037 (Ala. App. 1984) (clerical errors are errors associated with mistakes in transcription,
alterations or omission of any papers and documents - a mistake mechanical in nature); Marchel
v. Bunger, 533 P.2d 406, 408 (Wash. App. 1975) (a clerical error involves a mere mechanical
mistake while ajudicial error involves an issue of substance); Us. v. Ceraso, 355 F.Supp. 126,
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128-29 (M.D. Penn. 1973) (an error in a date is a typical example ofa clerical error; failing to
sign an order is not a clerical error).
Had the District Court simply transposed some of the numbers in the case number, that
would have been a clerical error. But, that is not what happened here. Rather, the Court
specifically issued the no contact order in an actual, although dismissed, case. That is not a
clerical error - that is an error arising from oversight or omission by the court. Robinson, supra.
As such it cannot be corrected under ICR 36.
What happened in this case was not a clerical error - it was an error in issuing a no
contact order in a dismissed case. And a defendant cannot be convicted for violating a no contact
order issued after a case has been dismissed.
Lastly, the State argues that Mr. Vaughn may not challenge his conviction for violation of
the no contact order on dates preceding the service of the "amended" order because Mr. Vaughn
signed the "amended" order with the knowledge that the order stated it was "effective nunc pro
tunc" and because the time has already run to appeal from the order. Respondent's Brief at pages
9-10, citing IAR 14(a). However, the State cites no authority for its unspoken premise that
signing an order marks something other than an acknowledgment that the order has been
physically delivered to the signor and is enforceable from that point forward if it otherwise
complies with the law. See ICR 46.2(a) which requires an order to be in writing and signed by
the defendant. Moreover, in this case, Mr. Vaughn is appealing from his conviction, not from the
no contact order. The State's argument that he is time barred from appealing from the no contact
order is irrelevant to the question before the Court in this appeal - whether Mr. Vaughn can be
prosecuted either for violating the 2009 order which was entered without jurisdiction in a case
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that had been dismissed or for violations of the 2012 order occurring before service of the order
on him. The State has offered no argument to support its premise that ICR 46.2(a) does not
require service and that courts can enter orders nunc pro tunc which will then make contacts
prior to the defendant's knowledge of the order felonious. The State may have failed to offer
support for its argument because authorizing felony convictions for violation of nunc pro tunc no
contact orders for contacts made prior to service of the order would violate the ex post facto
clauses of the state and federal constitutions. U.S. Const. Art. I, § 9, cl. 3; Idaho Const. Art. I, §

16. See also, Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (Dall.) 386, 390 (1798) (ex post facto clause violated "by
every law that makes an action done before the passage ofthe law and innocent when done
criminal, and punishes that action"); Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 101 S.Ct. 960 (1981);

State v. Manzanares, 152 Idaho 410, 419-20, 272 P.3d 382,391-92 (2011).
Because the District Court was without jurisdiction to enter the 2009 order in a dismissed
case and because the 2012 order did not become enforceable until it was served on Mr. Vaughn
in 2012, the District Court erred in denying the motion to dismiss the charges of violations
occurring in 2010. Nothing the State has presented in its briefing alters this outcome.

III. CONCLUSION
Mr. Vaughn asks this Court to reverse the denial of his motion to dismiss and remand
with instructions to allow him to withdraw his guilty plea and to dismiss the case.
Respectfully submitted this

.1"~ day of December, 2013.
Deborah Whipple
Attorney for Charles Va ghn, Jr.
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